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Abstract
Social anxiety is characterised by a bias to recall negative social autobiographical memories as well as anxious expecta-
tions about future social interactions. Neuroscientific research shows that a shared neural network underlies both temporal 
directions of autobiographical recall and future self-projections. Inspired by these findings, the current study tested the 
effectiveness of a Cognitive Bias Modification training to induce expectancies about the outcome of possible future social 
interactions (CBM-E). Its effects on interpretation bias, autobiographical recall and personal future projections were tested 
additionally. Participants read short social scenarios that could possibly happen to them in the future. Each scenario ended 
in word-fragment which, when completed, disambiguated the meaning of the scenario in either an optimistic or pessimistic 
way contingent on experimental condition. The CBM-E training was tested in 120 student participants and appeared effec-
tive in changing expectancies. The effect generalized to social interpretation bias (scrambled sentences). No direct effects 
of the training were found on autobiographical recall or future projections. However, participants trained to have pessimistic 
expectancies who had higher attachment anxiety showed a less positive interpretation bias related to the future. Furthermore, 
participants with high social anxiety reported less positive personal future projections when trained to have optimistic social 
expectancies.
Keywords Cognitive Bias Modification · Interpretation bias · Autobiographical Memory · Social anxiety · Attachment 
anxiety · Experimental psychopathology
Introduction
Autobiographical memory contains memories of our per-
sonal experiences as well as semantic knowledge about our-
selves and the world. Our autobiographical memories are 
strongly linked to our sense of self, and in turn, memories 
can be more or less accessible according to their relevance 
to our current self. The Self-Memory System model of auto-
biographical memory (SMS model; Conway 2005; Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce 2000) proposes several components 
that are involved in the recall of autobiographical memo-
ries. First, the autobiographical knowledge base contains 
the memories of our personal experiences. These are organ-
ized along a hierarchy of generality from specific episodic 
memories to lifetime periods, and horizontally according to 
different themes (e.g., “relationships”). Second, the ‘work-
ing self’ consists of a complex interacting set of goals (e.g. 
“graduating from high school”) and self-images (e.g. “I am 
a persistent student”), that are rooted in the autobiographical 
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knowledge base. The working self regulates the encod-
ing and recall of autobiographical information. Memories 
that are relevant to our goals (e.g., being liked by others) 
and self-images (e.g., I am boring) are highly accessible. 
Third, the working self constantly interacts with executive 
processes, the last component, to encode and retrieve self-
relevant memories stored in the autobiographical knowledge 
base.
If we assume that people suffering from psychopathol-
ogy hold goals and self-images related to their disorder, the 
SMS would predict that disorder-relevant autobiographical 
memories would be highly accessible in both involuntary 
and voluntary recall. For involuntary recall, for example, this 
is clearly illustrated by the presence of intrusive memories 
in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (American Psy-
chiatric Association 2013). Research has also focused on 
memory bias in social anxiety. For voluntary recall, research 
has identified high accessibility of disorder-congruent auto-
biographical memories in PTSD (Sutherland and Bryant 
2005, 2008), prolonged grief (Maccallum and Bryant 2008, 
2010), and social anxiety (Krans et al. 2013, 2017). Gen-
erally, there appears to be no convincing evidence for an 
implicit memory bias in social anxiety. However, explicit 
recall of threatening information, especially of autobio-
graphical nature, appears to be influenced in social anxiety 
(Mitte 2008; Morgan 2010). For example, highly socially 
anxious students recalled more (negative) autobiographical 
memories about social interactions in response to emotional 
word cues as well as more social anxiety-related goals than 
students low in social anxiety (Krans et al. 2013). This pat-
tern was replicated in a clinical sample. Social anxiety disor-
der (SAD) patients recalled more (negative) autobiographi-
cal memories of social interactions in response to emotional 
cue words compared to a demographically matched healthy 
control group. They also reported more social anxiety-
related future goals and current self-images, supporting a 
temporal dimension of cognitive bias that spans the past, 
present and future (Krans et al. 2017). These findings are 
in line with cognitive models of SAD (Clark 2001; Clark 
and Wells 1995; Heimberg et al. 2010; Rapee and Heimberg 
1997) which, taken together, converge on the idea that indi-
viduals with social anxiety have negative expectations and 
interpretations of (future) social situations and they encode 
and rehearse these negative experiences in post-ruminative 
processing, resulting in highly accessible negative autobio-
graphical memories, which further support negative future 
expectations and interpretations, thereby completing the 
cycle. Thus, biased future expectations and autobiographi-
cal recall appear to be closely linked in social anxiety.
Currently, the relation between autobiographical recall 
and future projection is an increasingly important topic 
in memory research (e.g., Allé et al. 2018; Del Palacio-
Gonzalez and Berntsen 2019; Hallford et al. 2018). In the 
neurocognitive literature, a large overlap has been described 
in neural networks of autobiographical recall and future pro-
jection of the self, which include prefrontal and temporal 
lobes with a central role for hippocampal regions (Schacter 
et al. 2008). Several studies have also shown a significant 
overlap in the cognitive mechanisms of recalling the past 
and projecting the self in the future. For example, the level 
of specificity with which suicidal and healthy participants 
recalled the past and imagined the future was found to be 
positively correlated, and experimental induction of memory 
retrieval style (generic or specific) affected also future pro-
jections (Williams et al. 1996). In a study on phenomeno-
logical characteristics of mental time travel, it was found that 
temporal distance and emotional valence behave similarly in 
autobiographical recall and future projections (D’Argembeau 
and Van der Linden 2004). Furthermore, an experimental 
manipulation of self-efficacy affected the specificity and 
valence of recall and future projection comparably, showing 
a causal link between the two temporal dimensions (Brown 
et al. 2012).
The current literature thus suggests that the temporal 
dimensions of mental time travel (i.e., recalling the past and 
imagining the personal future) are related to each other, and 
that both may play a role in social anxiety. However, up to 
now, most findings have been correlational in nature and 
therefore preclude causal interpretations. The main goal 
of the present study was to examine the causal effect of 
future social expectancies on the valence of autobiographi-
cal recall and future projections of social situations, as an 
operationalization of memory selectivity. This was done by 
experimentally manipulating expectancies of the outcome 
of possible future social scenarios for which we developed 
a future-oriented version of the Cognitive Bias Modification 
of Interpretation (CBM-I) training paradigm (Mathews and 
Mackintosh 2000). CBM-I offers a systematic computerized 
training that modifies an interpretation style (Hirsch et al. 
2016). Typically, participants are presented with ambiguous 
written scenarios that consists of approximately three short 
sentences. In the last sentence, a crucial target is presented as 
a word fragment. Completing the word fragment resolves the 
ambiguity of the scenario in either a positive or a negative 
way depending on the experimental condition. By repeated 
presentations of this valence contingency, a positive or nega-
tive interpretation bias is induced. It has been shown that a 
CBM-I training successfully induced an interpretation bias 
(Mathews and Mackintosh 2000; Menne-Lothmann et al. 
2014), and can even affect memory for previously encoded 
ambiguous social scenarios in a valence-congruent way (De 
Winter et al. 2018; Salemink et al. 2010).
In the current study, we created a CBM-Expectancy 
training (CBM-E) based on the CBM-I procedure to mod-
ify expectancies of the outcome of possible future social 
situations. We phrased social scenarios in the future tense 
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and asked participants to vividly imagine these events 
happening to them in the future. The scenarios system-
atically ended in a positive/optimistic way or a negative/
pessimistic way to create two experimental conditions. 
Our first research question was whether this training was 
effective in inducing an expectancy bias (optimistic vs 
pessimistic). We predicted that participants in the opti-
mism condition would show a more positive expectancy 
bias than participants in the pessimism condition after the 
CBM-E training. Second, we tested whether expectancy 
bias would affect the valence of autobiographical recall 
and autobiographical future projections. We expected 
that participants in the optimism condition would recall 
autobiographical memories and future projections with a 
higher positive valence than participants in the pessimism 
condition.
In CBM research, the bias assessment procedure that 
is typically used to confirm the effectiveness of the CBM 
training is often highly similar to the training procedure 
(Salemink et al. 2010). Thereby changes in the bias could 
reflect a response bias rather than an actual change in 
the index bias. Applying a second measurement strategy 
increases the validity of the findings. Therefore, we tested 
whether the CBM-E training would affect interpreta-
tion bias measured with an implicit measure (scrambled 
sentences task). Because the CBM-E was based on the 
standard CBM-I procedure, we expected generalization 
of our training effects to interpretation bias. Specifically, 
we predicted that participants in the optimism condition 
would show more positive resolutions of social and future 
oriented scrambled sentences than participants in the pes-
simism condition.
Fourth, social anxiety is a developmental outcome of 
insecure attachment relationships (Manning et al. 2017). 
More specifically, if individuals lack trust in the avail-
ability of attachment figures’ support during distress, they 
respond to distress more anxiously or more avoidantly 
attached. More anxiously attached individuals seek sup-
port while constantly fearing new relational disappoint-
ments, which hyperactivates stress levels. Instead, more 
avoidantly attached individuals refuse to seek attachment 
figure support in an attempt to avoid further relational 
ruptures. This requires them to deactivate (negative) 
emotions (Cassidy 1994; Kobak and Bosmans 2018). 
Although anxious attachment is most strongly linked 
with social anxiety, both insecure attachment styles are 
linked with social anxiety symptoms. Importantly, inse-
cure attachment has proven to moderate the effectiveness 
of symptom-focused interventions (Bosmans 2016). For 
these reasons, additional measures of social anxiety and 
attachment were explored as moderators of the CBM-E 
training effects.
Method
This study follows the principles of the Declaration of 
Helsinki and was approved by the Social and Societal Eth-
ics Committee of the KU Leuven (reference G-2014 11 
096). All participants gave written consent to the inclu-
sion of material pertaining to themselves, acknowledged 
that they cannot be identified via the paper, and data was 
fully anonymized. All mandatory health and safety pro-
cedures were complied with in the course of conducting 
this experiment.
Participants
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate psy-
chology student participant pool at the KU Leuven. They 
received course credits for participation. In total, 128 stu-
dent participants were tested. Demographic information 
was obtained using a brief questionnaire (sex, age, univer-
sity course, marital status, and nationality). Due to techni-
cal problems, data from eight participants were lost. The 
final dataset included 60 participants in each condition.
Materials
Individual Differences
Symptoms of social anxiety were measured with the 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz 1987). 
The LSAS contains 24 items that assess fear and avoidance 
for different social behaviours. Internal consistency in our 
sample was α = 0.96 for the total LSAS score, α = 0.93 for 
the fear subscale, and α = 0.91 for the avoidance subscale. 
Levels of depression were measured with the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al. 1996). This is a 21 
item self-report questionnaire. Internal consistency in our 
sample was α = 0.85. The BDI-II was solely included to 
ensure that there were no baseline difference between the 
conditions on (clinical) depression. The Depression Anxi-
ety Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond and Lovibond 
1995) self-report questionnaire was administered to assess 
depression, anxiety and stress with 21 items. Internal con-
sistency in our sample was α = 0.93 for the total DASS-21 
score, α = 0.90 for the depression subscale, α = 0.77 for the 
anxiety subscale, and α = 0.89 for the stress subscale. The 
Experiences in Close Relationships Scale-Revised (ECR-R; 
Fraley et al. 2000) was administered to assess adult attach-
ment anxiety and attachment avoidance. It is a 36 item self-
report questionnaire. Internal consistency in our sample was 
α = 0.89 for the anxiety subscale, and α = 0.91 for the avoid-
ance subscale.
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Control Measures
The emotional impact of the CBM training was assessed 
with a mood questionnaire consisting of five items (opti-
mism, anxiety, happiness, sadness, and arousal) rated on 
a Likert scale from 1 (‘neutral’) to 10 (‘as much as I can 
imagine’).
Autobiographical memory (AM) bias at baseline was 
measured by instructing participants to ‘Please recall a time 
when you attended a party or other social gathering where 
you hardly knew any other people.’ Participants were asked 
to recall this memory as vividly as possible, and then rate 
memory valence on a Likert scale running from -3 (very 
negative) to +3 (very positive). Additional Likert scales 
were administered measuring vividness (1 = ‘not vivid at 
all’, 9 = ‘very vivid’), and vantage perspective (1 = ‘through 
my own eyes’, 9 = ‘like through the eyes of an observer’). 
Only the valence score was analysed in this paper as a rand-
omization check. Other measures were included for explora-
tory reasons and will not be reported here.
To account for possible demand effects, participants were 
asked what they thought the goal of the present study was 
with an open-ended question. Answers were rated as sus-
pecting the goal if they mentioned any training effects on 
their memories.
Cognitive Bias Modification of Expectancy (CBM‑E)
CBM‑E Training
Participants were presented with different scenarios for 
which they were instructed to imagine themselves as the 
main actor in the scenario as vividly as possible. Scenar-
ios were based on studies by Salemink et al. (2007), and 
Salemink et al. (2010). The scenarios were rewritten in the 
future tense and were presented in an introductory text as 
events that could possibly happen to the participants in the 
near future. Each scenario was preceded with a title (e.g., 
‘New outfit’) and ended in a word fragment which the partic-
ipants were asked to complete. The meaning of the scenarios 
remained ambiguous until the word fragment was solved. In 
the optimism condition, these resolved the scenario in a pos-
itive way, thereby creating a positive expectancy for the out-
comes of future social events. In the pessimism condition, 
the word fragments resolved the scenario in a negative way, 
thereby creating a negative expectancy for the outcomes of 
future social events. An example of a scenario is ‘You will 
arrive at a party in a new outfit. When you walk in, everyone 
will look at you, and they will think that your outfit is…’, 
with the word fragment ‘gr_at’ (optimism condition) or 
‘awf_l’ (pessimism condition). Participants were instructed 
to press the space bar as soon as they recognised the word, 
and then to press the missing letter from the word fragment. 
When correct, the completed word fragmented was shown 
on screen. When incorrect, an X appeared after which they 
saw the word fragment again for another attempt. After each 
scenario, a comprehension question appeared (e.g., ‘Will the 
people at the party like your new outfit?’) and participants 
had to respond K (for ‘yes’) or D (for ‘no’). If the participant 
answered correctly, the next scenario was presented. If they 
responded incorrectly, a red X appeared on screen and they 
received the question again.
The training started with three neutral practice trials. 
Thereafter, participants received eight training blocks, each 
containing (1) eight training scenarios with differing word 
fragments according to condition, (2) three neutral scenar-
ios, (3) one positive target scenario, and one negative target 
scenario (to analyse the training effect). Thus, each block 
contained 13 scenarios. Neutral scenarios were the same for 
both conditions and were included to make the goal of the 
training less obvious. The positive and negative target sce-
narios were also the same for both conditions, and were criti-
cal to test the effect of the CBM-E on the expectancy bias. 
The order of the scenarios was randomized within blocks.
Training Effectiveness: RTs and Expectancy Bias Assessment
The time to resolve the positive and negative target scenarios 
from the training were recorded (reaction times) as a meas-
ure of training effectiveness. That is, if the training is effec-
tive, participants in the optimism condition should become 
faster in responding (e.g., quicker in pressing the space bar 
when the word fragment appeared) to positive scenarios than 
negative scenarios compared to participants in the pessi-
mism condition.
An additional expectancy bias assessment was conducted 
before and after the training. Participants received 10 sce-
narios in a format similar to the training (e.g., ‘You will 
be invited to a night out in the local bar, but you will not 
know any of the people very well. When you approach the 
entrance, you will hear music and loud conversations, but as 
soon as you enter, it becomes…’) in random order, but here 
the ambiguity was not resolved by the word fragment (e.g., 
‘qu_et’). As in the training, each scenario was preceded by 
a title (e.g., ‘The local bar’) and followed by a comprehen-
sion question. One practice trial was presented before the 
10 assessment trials. After all scenarios were completed, 
participants were presented with the title of each scenario 
one by one in random order. Four statements relating to the 
scenario were printed below the title in random order. Par-
ticipants were instructed to read each statement and rate how 
likely it was in relation to the scenario on a scale from 1 
(‘very unlikely’) to 4 (‘very likely’). One target statement 
represented a positive expectancy (e.g., ‘When you enter 
the room, someone will come up to greet you warmly’), one 
represented a negative expectancy (e.g., ‘When you enter 
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the room, everyone will stop and stare at you’), and two 
were foil statements that represented a more general posi-
tive and negative expectation. A positive expectancy bias 
index was calculated by subtracting the likelihood ratings 
of negative target statements from those of positive target 
statements for each participant (pre-training: α = .69; post-
training: α = .69). The foil statements were assessed to test 
for generalization of the induced bias with a similar calcula-
tion (pre-training: α = .56; post-training: α = .44).
Training Effects
Autobiographical Memories and Future Projections
The modified Autobiographical Memory Test (M-AMT) 
was used to assess valence of autobiographical recall and 
future projections (Brown et  al. 2013). The M-AMT is 
based on previous research on autobiographical recall and 
future thinking (e.g., Addis et al. 2007; Crovitz and Schiff-
man 1974). In a pilot study with 30 undergraduate students 
from the KU Leuven, participants were presented with 32 
concrete neutral cue words (e.g., lemon, truck) and asked 
to recall a specific autobiographical memory (from 5 years 
or longer ago) and a possible specific future event (5 years 
or more into the future) which reflected a social situation in 
response to the cue word. Future events had to be plausible 
yet novel experiences, i.e., something that had never hap-
pened to the participant, to avoid overlap with a specific 
memory. Eight cue words were selected based on the brief-
est mean reaction times, which we took as an indication of 
feasibility of the task. These eight words were randomly 
assigned to one of two word-lists, each consisting of four cue 
words (shoes, insect, snake, kettle, and truck, lemon, hearth, 
dress). In the final M-AMT task participants were presented 
with one of the lists for memory recall (past condition) and 
the other word list for future projections (future condition). 
Order of time instruction (past/future) and word list (1 or 2) 
was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were 
given a maximum time of 3 min per response, thus the maxi-
mum duration of the M-AMT was approximately 25 min. 
After each response, participants were asked to provide a 
valence rating on a Likert scale from -3 (‘very negative’), 0 
(‘neutral’), to +3 (‘very positive) for the memory or projec-
tion. The average valence ratings across responses in each 
condition (past, future) were calculated for each participant, 
reflecting memory bias and future projection bias, respec-
tively. However, the internal consistency of this version of 
the M-AMT turned out to be poor, with α = .11 for the past 
condition and α = .15 for the future condition.
Interpretation Bias
To assess the effect of the CBM-E training on social and 
future interpretation biases we included a Scrambled Sen-
tences Test (SST; Wenzlaff 1993). Participants were pre-
sented with 20 scrambled sentences in random order. Ten 
of these sentences reflected social situations (e.g., “/people/
I’m/new/with/confident/nervous”; from Standage et  al. 
2010) and ten reflected thoughts about the future (e.g., “/
always/I/rarely/make/ahead/plans”; from Demeyer and De 
Raedt 2014). Participants were instructed to form grammati-
cally correct sentences using five out of the six words in 
the sentence. Each sentence could be completed in either 
a negative or a positive way depending on the word that 
was left out. During the SST participants were instructed to 
keep in mind a nine-digit number (882045185, created by 
random number generation) which they were asked to recall 
after the SST. This provided a cognitive load which should 
elicit more automatic (and thereby more biased) responses 
on the SST. The number of positive solutions were summed 
per participant for the social and future sentences separately 
as indices for social (α = .88) and future-related (α = .82) 
interpretation biases, respectively.
Procedure
After reading and signing an informed consent form, par-
ticipants completed a demographic questionnaire, the LSAS, 
the BDI-II, DASS-21, and ECR, in this order. They then 
completed the mood ratings, and the baseline autobiographi-
cal memory item. Participants were alternatingly assigned 
to the optimism or pessimism condition to ensure an equal 
number of participants in each condition. After the second 
bias assessment, mood ratings were provided again. Because 
the CBM training could have mood effects and these could 
affect responses on outcome measures as well, a distracter 
task (a simple version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; 
Grant and Berg 1948), was presented after the second bias 
assessment, and then mood ratings were taken a third time. 
Then, participants completed the M-AMT and the SST, 
respectively. To conclude, participants were asked about 
their perceived goal of the study (demand question). After 
study completion, participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their participation. Participants were tested individually 
in a lab cubicle. All measures were presented on a Dell Lati-
tude laptop using Inquisit software (version 4.0.9.0), except 
the M-AMT which was delivered in person by a trained Mas-
ters level student.
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Results
Descriptive statistics of individual differences, control vari-
ables, and direct and generalized training effects are reported 
in Table 1.
Participants
Chi square analyses and independent samples t-tests 
showed there were no significant group differences in 
gender distribution (10 men and 50 women, and 9 men 
and 51 women in the optimism and pessimism condition, 
respectively), age (M = 19.97, SD = 2.30 and M = 20.27, 
SD = 3.74 in the optimism and pessimism condition, 
respectively), university course (49 psychology and 10 
other, and 55 psychology and 5 other in the optimism and 
pessimism condition, respectively), or marital status (57 
single and 3 other in both conditions), all p > .15. There 
was a significant difference in the distribution of nation-
ality, with relatively more Belgians (48) than non-Bel-
gians (7 Dutch and 5 other) in the pessimism condition 
compared to the optimism condition (58 Belgians and 5 
Dutch), χ2(2) = 8.72, p = .01.
Individual Differences
Baseline group differences in social anxiety (LSAS total 
score, fear subscale, avoidance subscale), depression (BDI-
II, DASS-21 depression scale), anxiety and stress (DASS-21 
anxiety and stress subscales), and adult attachment (ECR 
anxiety and avoidance subscales) were tested with independ-
ent samples t-tests. There were no significant group differ-
ences, all t < 1.95, all p > .05, except for the ECR scales. 
Attachment anxiety was marginally significantly higher in 
the pessimism condition, t(118) = 1.95, p = .05, and attach-
ment avoidance was significantly higher in the pessimism 
condition, t(118) = 2.04, p = .04. This was due to two outliers 
in the pessimism condition, with scores higher than three 
times the standard deviation above the group mean. These 
cases did not have outlying scores on any of the dependent 
variables (SST or M-AMT). DASS-21 scores were entered 
as covariates in the analyses which tested the effectiveness 
of the training and the effect of training on the interpretation 
bias and valence of autobiographical memories and future 
projections. This was done because depression, anxiety and 
stress may plausibly influence the effect of the training. The 
DASS-21 can be entered as a covariate because there are no 
significant group differences at baseline (Miller and Chap-
man 2001), and controlling for the covariate can therefore 
increase statistical power.
Control Measures
A 3 (Time: pre-CBM, post-CBM, post-filler) × 2 (Condi-
tion: optimism, pessimism) mixed model repeated measures 
MANOVA was run with the mood items as multiple depend-
ent variables, Time as a within-subject variable and Con-
dition as the between-subjects variable. Multivariate tests 
showed a main effect of Time, F(10, 109) = 7.72, p < .001, 
Cohen’s f = 0.85, suggesting that the CBM training affected 
mood across conditions. Univariate tests showed significant 
Time effects for all mood items, smallest F > 4.14, largest 
p < .02, smallest f > 0.18. Pairwise comparisons (significance 
level of α = 0.05) showed that, across conditions, optimism, 
anxiety, and happiness decreased significantly from pre-
CBM to post-CBM, all p < .01, but did not change from 
post-CBM to post-filler, all p > .12. Sadness decreased from 
pre-CBM to post-CBM, and decreased further from post-
CBM to post-filler, both p = .03. Arousal decreased from 
pre-CBM to post-CBM, p = .03, but returned to baseline lev-
els at post-filler, p = .91. There was no significant main effect 
of Condition, F(5, 114) = 0.72, p = .61. The Time × Condi-
tion was not significant, F(10, 109) = 1.78, p = .07. Impor-
tantly, independent t-tests showed that post-filler mood was 
comparable between the two conditions for all mood items, 
largest t < 1.01, smallest p > .31. Thus, it was unlikely that 
any mood effects of the training were responsible for train-
ing effects.
Independent t-tests showed no significant differences 
between conditions on the valence of the autobiographical 
memory at baseline, t(118) = 0.12, p = .91.
In the optimism group, there were three participants 
who suspected that the CBM training was aimed at mak-
ing them more positive. In the pessimism group, two par-
ticipants suspected that the CBM-training was aimed at 
making them more negative. This difference was not sig-
nificant, χ2(1) = 0.21, p = .65. In each group, the number of 
participants that suspected the goal of the study was low. All 
analyses were rerun without these five participants but the 
pattern of results was similar. Therefore, it was decided not 
to exclude their data from the analyses.
Training Effectiveness: RTs and Expectancy Bias 
Assessment
Training RTs
Reaction times (RTs) to positive and negative target sce-
narios were analyzed as a measure of training effectiveness. 
In total, 13.20% of trials were excluded, which were trials 
with incorrect answers either to the word fragment (55.56% 
of total excluded trials) and/or the comprehension question 
(44.44% of excluded trials). No trials needed to be excluded 
based on extremely short (< 200 ms) or long RTs (M + 3SD), 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics of individual differences, control variables, and direct and generalized training effects
Optimism condition Pessimism condition
Sex (n) Men 10 9
Women 50 51
Age, M (SD) 19.97 (2.30) 20.27 (3.74)
Course (n) Psychology 49 55
Other 10 5
Marital status (n) Single 57 57
Other (married, cohabitating, divorced) 3 3
Nationality (n) Belgian 48 58
Dutch 7 5
Other 5 0




LSAS Total 36.65 (17.48) 39.78 (24.28)
Fear 19.03 (10.14) 21.50 (12.61)
Avoidance 17.62 (8.73) 18.28 (12.37)
BDI-II 6.78 (5.64) 9.05 (7.02)
DASS-21 Depression 3.13 (3.62) 3.50 (4.50)
Anxiety 2.98 (2.41) 3.42 (3.58)
Stress 5.23 (6.00) 3.89 (4.44)
ECR Anxiety 2.68 (1.01) 3.04 (1.04)
Avoidance 2.66 (0.87) 3.05 (1.20)




Optimism Pre-CBM 5.35 (2.15) 5.27 (2.13)
Post-CBM 4.55 (2.39) 4.55 (2.47)
Post-filler 4.52 (2.53) 4.97 (2.39)
Anxiety Pre-CBM 1.15 (1.44) 1.70 (1.92)
Post-CBM 0.98 (1.42) 0.90 (1.32)
Post-filler 0.93 (1.44) 0.98(1.59)
Happiness Pre-CBM 4.73 (2.55) 5.22 (2.07)
Post-CBM 4.17 (2.57) 4.35 (2.50)
Post-filler 4.20 (2.70) 4.47 (2.57)
Sadness Pre-CBM 1.28 (1.67) 2.20 (2.19)
Post-CBM 1.27 (1.89) 1.47 (1.72)
Post-filler 1.07 (1.79) 1.25 (1.73)
Arousal Pre-CBM 2.37 (2.39) 3.05 (2.41)
Post-CBM 2.20 (2.46) 2.52 (2.55)
Post-filler 2.50 (2.45) 2.88 (2.64)
Baseline autobiographical memory valence 1.03 (1.55) 1.07 (1.58)




RT target scenarios Positive 1506.38 (392.71) 1805.18 (754.00)
Negative 2140.85 (1081.96) 1585.53 (466.85)
Positive expectancy bias Pre-training 0.54 (0.61) 0.40 (0.64)
Post-training 0.72 (0.58) 0.09 (0.63)
Generalized exp. bias Pre-training 0.29 (0.45) 0.28 (0.58)
Post-training 0.48 (0.43) 0.13 (0.52)
SST Social 7.12 (2.32) 6.10 (2.89)
Future 6.80 (1.88) 6.42 (2.26)
M-AMT valence Past 0.34 (0.90) 0.54 (0.93)
Future 0.85 (0.96) 1.15 (0.88)
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M = 1757.78 ms, SD = 1984.05 ms. A 2 (Target: positive 
scenario vs negative scenario) × 2 (Condition: optimism vs 
pessimism) mixed model ANCOVA was run with reaction 
times (in ms) as the dependent variable, Target as a within-
subject variable, Condition as a between-subjects variable, 
and DASS-21 subscale scores as covariates. There was 
no significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 115) = 1.78, 
p = .19, thus, average reaction times during the training were 
comparable in the two conditions. There was no significant 
main effect of Target, F(1, 115) = 1.57, p = .21, indicat-
ing that across conditions participants responded equally 
fast to positive and negative target scenarios. Importantly, 
the Target × Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 
115) = 24.62, p < .01, f = 0.46, see Fig. 1. Because the covari-
ates (DASS-21) were not significantly related to reaction 
times in the ANCOVA (all p > .17), these were not included 
in the follow-up tests.
Paired samples t-tests showed that participants in the 
optimism condition were significantly faster in responding 
to positive targets relative to negative targets, t(59) = 4.53, 
p < .01, d = 0.86, whereas participants in the pessimism 
condition were significantly faster in responding to negative 
targets than positive targets, t(59) = 2.19, p = .03, d = 0.36.
Expectancy Bias Assessment
The effect of the training on the expectancy bias was tested by 
comparing the change in the expectancy bias index between 
the two conditions. This was done with a 2 (Time: pre-CBM 
vs post-CBM) × 2 (Condition: optimism vs pessimism) mixed 
model ANCOVA with the positive expectancy bias index as 
the dependent variable, Time as the within-subject variable, 
Condition as the between-subjects variable, and the DASS-
21 subscale scores as covariates. There was no significant 
main effect of Time, F(1, 115) = 2.10, p = .15. There was a 
significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 115) = 16.92, p < .01, 
f = 0.38, showing a more positive expectancy bias across time 
in the optimism condition compared to the pessimism con-
dition. Importantly, the Time × Condition interaction was 
significant, F(1, 115) = 18.00, p < .01, f = 0.40 (see Fig. 2, 
Top). DASS-21 depression and stress were significant in the 
ANCOVA (p = .003 and p = .043, respectively), therefore, 
these were included in the follow-up tests. Repeated meas-
ures ANCOVA within each condition showed that the positive 
expectancy bias did not change significantly in the optimism 
condition, F(1, 57) = 0.03, p = .857. However, positive expec-
tancy significantly decreased in the pessimism condition, F(1, 
Table 1  (continued)
LSAS Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, BDI-II Beck Depression Inventory-II, DASS-21 Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21, ECR Experiences 








positive target negative target
optimisim condition pessimism condition
Fig. 1  Mean reaction times (in ms) per condition (optimism, pessi-

























optimism condition pessimism condition
Fig. 2  Top: Positive expectancy bias (likelihood of positive target 
statements minus negative target statements) before and after the 
CBM training in the optimism and pessimism condition. Bottom: 
Generalized Positive expectancy bias (likelihood of positive foil 
statements minus negative foil statements) before and after the CBM 
training in the optimism and pessimism condition. Error bars repre-
sent standard deviations
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57) = 8.67, p = .005, f = 0.39, indicating that, as intended, the 
manipulation resulted in a difference in optimism between the 
two conditions.
A similar analysis was run for the generalized positive 
expectancy bias (based on the general foil statements), 
with similar results. There was no significant main effect 
of Time, F(1, 115) = 0.90, p = .35. There was a significant 
main effect of condition, F(1, 115) = 5.14, p = .03, f = 0.21, 
showing a more positive generalized expectancy bias overall 
in the optimism condition. The Time × Condition interaction 
was also significant, F(1, 115) = 13.58, p < .01, f = 0.34 (see 
Fig. 2, Bottom). The DASS-21 depression scale was a sig-
nificant covariate (p = .001) and was included in follow-up 
ANCOVAs. There was a significant increase in the optimism 
condition, F(1, 58) = 4.12, p = .047, f = 0.27, and a signifi-
cant decrease in the pessimism condition, F(1, 58) = 4.59, 
p = .036, f = 0.28.
Training Effects
Autobiographical Memory and Future Projection Bias
Two ANCOVAs were run to test whether expectancy bias 
affected the valence of autobiographical recall and autobio-
graphical future projections. Condition (optimism, pessi-
mism) was the independent variable, the number of positive 
memories/future projections on the M-AMT the dependent 
variable respectively, and DASS-21 subscale scores were 
included as covariates. There were no significant differences 
between the two experimental conditions in the number 
of positive autobiographical memories, F(1, 115) = 0.45, 
p = .506, or future projections, F(1, 115) = 0.56, p = .456, on 
the M-AMT. These findings suggest that the CBM training 
effect did not generalize to biases in autobiographical recall 
or future projections for social situations.
Interpretation Bias
To test the effect of the CBM-E training on social interpre-
tation bias, a one-way ANCOVA was run with Condition 
(optimism vs pessimism) as the independent variable, the 
number of positive solutions on the social items of the SST 
as the dependent variable, and DASS-21 subscale scores as 
covariates. The main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 
115) = 4.04, p = .047, f = 0.19, and indicated a more positive 
interpretation bias in the optimism condition. An ANCOVA 
was run with the mean number of positive solutions for the 
future items on the SST as the dependent variable. This indi-
cated no significant difference between the two conditions, 
F(1, 115) = 0.74, p = .39.
Moderation by Social Anxiety, Attachment Anxiety 
and Attachment Avoidance
It was tested whether social anxiety or attachment moderated 
the relationship between the training and the memory/future 
projection bias (Table 2) and interpretation biases (Table 3). 
The DASS-21 subscales correlated significantly with each 
of the moderators and were therefore not included in these 
regression models. The first block always contained the 
valence rating of the autobiographical memory at baseline. 
The second block added a dummy variable for experimen-
tal condition. The third block added the moderator (LSAS 
total score, ECR anxiety, or ECR avoidance). Finally, the 
interaction term between condition (dummy variable) and 
the standardized scores of the moderator were entered to test 
the moderation effect. 
Interpretation Bias (SST)
There was no significant moderation of the relation between 
the CBM-E training and interpretation bias for social sen-
tences on the SST. Attachment anxiety was the only signifi-
cant moderator of the relation between the CBM-E training 
and the interpretation bias for future-related sentences on the 
SST. The interaction equation indicated that higher attach-
ment anxiety was related to fewer positive interpretations of 
future-oriented sentences in the pessimism condition than in 
the optimism condition (see Fig. 3, Top).
Memory and Future Projection Bias
There was no significant moderation of the relation between 
the CBM-E training and valence of autobiographical memo-
ries on the M-AMT. Social anxiety was the only signifi-
cant moderator of the relation between the CBM-E training 
and the valence of future projections on the M-AMT. The 
interaction equation indicated that higher social anxiety 
was related to fewer positive future projections in the opti-
mism condition than in the pessimism condition (see Fig. 3, 
Bottom).
Discussion
The current experiment aimed to test the effectiveness of 
a CBM-E training designed to alter future expectancies in 
the social domain (expectancy bias) in an unselected stu-
dent sample. Furthermore, we aimed to test the effect of 
this training on the valence of autobiographical memory 
recall and future projections. The standard CBM-I training 
(Mathews and Mackintosh 2000) was adapted to reflect pos-
sible future scenarios in order to test the effectiveness and 
effects of a CBM-Expectancy training (CBM-E). Relative 
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differences emerged between the optimism and pessimism 
condition, indicating that the CBM-E training worked as 
intended. That is, participants in the optimism condition 
responded faster to positive than negative target scenarios, 
whereas the reverse was true for participants in the pessi-
mism condition. Furthermore, a positivity bias index showed 
a reduction after training in the pessimism condition (i.e., 
becoming less positive about the future scenarios) but not 
in the optimism condition. The fact that participants in the 
optimism condition did not increase in positive expectan-
cies indicates that the training could be strengthened further, 
e.g., by means testing adapted instructions, revised items, 
and length of training. The training induced a more general 
expectancy style as more general positive foil statements 
were rated more likely in the optimism group, whereas 
the pessimism group became more pessimistic in general 
according to the foil statements in the bias assessment.
The training affected social interpretation bias, assessed 
with an indirect measure (scrambled sentences), showing 
more positive social interpretations in the optimism con-
dition as compared to the pessimism condition. This is an 
important finding because CBM training effects have been 
critiqued (see Jones and Sharpe 2017) because bias assess-
ments are very similar in procedure to the actual training, 
making is possible that a simple response bias related to 
the format is trained rather than an actual bias. The cur-
rent finding indicates that the training affected the actual 
bias at least to some extent, beyond a mere response bias 
effect. However, no such effect was found for future-related 
scenarios. This may indicate that the intended future aspect 
of the CBM-E training is not strong or clear enough for par-
ticipants. If that is the case, our CBM-E probably functioned 
as a standard CBM-I.
In contrast to predictions, the training did not have 
an impact on the valence of autobiographical recall and 
future projections as no group differences were found on 
the M-AMT. This could indicate that future expectations 
(or interpretation style) do not directly and causally affect 
autobiographical time travel in terms of valence. It is also 
possible that the cue words that were used in the M-AMT 
were not optimal for assessing any biases in autobiographi-
cal recall and projection. In contrast to earlier studies where 
such biases were found (e.g., Krans et al. 2013, 2017), the 
current cue words were neutral and concrete. It is possible 
that more abstract and emotional words are required in order 
to find biased responses. This remains to be tested. Finally, 
the internal consistency of this version of the M-AMT was 
poor in our sample. As far as we know, internal consisten-
cies have not been reported for the M-AMT in earlier papers; 
therefore it is unknown at this stage whether it is a general 
problem of the M-AMT or one specific to the current study. 
Either way, the M-AMT may not adequately reflect negative 
autobiographical memory bias in the current sample and we 
are hesitant to draw firm theoretical conclusions based on 
the current data.
It is also possible that a cross-over from expectancy bias 
to the autobiographical memory/projection bias does occur, 
but only for a specific subgroup of people. For example, 
we found that participants with more attachment anxiety 
showed a less positive interpretation bias for the future 
(SST) when in the pessimism condition. This indicates that 
people with higher attachment anxiety may be vulnerable 
for spiraling into pessimistic future thinking once negative 
expectancies are introduced. This idea is in line with the 
frequently observed tendency to hyperactivate negative emo-
tions in anxiously attached individuals (Brenning et al. 2012; 
Mikulincer et al. 2003). Further, participants with higher 
social anxiety produced fewer positive autobiographical 
future projections (M-AMT) when in the optimism condi-
tion. It is possible that confrontations with more ‘positive’ 
expectancies of outcomes of future social situations trig-
ger pre-event rumination in this subgroup. Taken together, 
Fig. 3  Top: Moderation of the effect of the CBM-E training by 
attachment anxiety (ECR-R) on the number of positive future inter-
pretations (SST). Bottom: Moderation of the effect of the CBM-E 
training by social anxiety (LSAS) on the number of positive autobio-
graphical future projections (M-AMT)
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the question whether future expectancies causally influence 
interpretation bias, and the valence of autobiographical men-
tal time travel does not seem straightforward and further 
studies in specific subgroups seem warranted.
This study had several limitations. First, the CBM-E 
training yielded mood effects, and these showed that even 
the optimism training was not experienced as very pleas-
ant. Indeed, several participants complained that the train-
ing was long and tedious, and this is a problem that has 
been identified in other CBM studies too (e.g., Beard et al. 
2011). It remains a challenge to develop a training which is 
persistent enough to change habitual cognitive styles without 
becoming overly repetitive and obvious. As to the specific 
nature of the current CBM-E, the data does not convincingly 
show that this adapted version was successful in changing 
future thinking. Rather, it seems that the training resembled 
more an interpretation bias training, which was not exactly 
what we intended. More research is needed to strengthen 
this CBM-E training’s focus on future thinking. This might 
require developing alternative training formats, such as vir-
tual reality (e.g., Otkhmezuri et al. 2019). Third, the inter-
nal consistency of the current version of the M-AMT was 
very poor, and the cue words in were neutral and concrete, 
in contrast to the abstract emotional cue words that were 
used in earlier studies to assess autobiographical memory 
bias in social anxiety (Krans et al. 2013, 2017). This may 
have prevented us from finding any autobiographical bias. 
Fourth, results from CBM, and also our experiment, might 
be applied to clinical populations. As a first step, we tested 
the training in a student population. This is a necessary 
first step in translational research from both an ethical and 
practical view. Results may have been different in a patient 
population. For example, based on earlier findings it is pos-
sible that a memory bias would have been found in clinical 
populations. Further, it is possible that the training may not 
be strong enough to change expectancy biases in patients. 
These are empirical questions that remain to be tested. Fur-
thermore, our sample consisted primarily of women, which 
further restricts generalizability of our results. Fifth, we did 
not include a follow-up assessment, although several CBM 
studies have shown that training cross-over effects take some 
time and are often not visible yet straight after the training. 
This may be another reason why we did not find the pre-
dicted effects on autobiographical valence.
Future studies are required to test the current (or an 
improved version of) CBM-E training in specific subclini-
cal or clinical subgroups, as our data indicated that social 
anxiety and attachment anxiety moderate the effects of 
the training on different variables. It is also worthwhile 
to test the training effects with a version of the M-AMT 
that includes abstract emotional cue words. Moreover, fur-
ther studies into an acceptable length of the training which 
maintains the training effect but reduces its tediousness are 
required. Follow-up assessments will also be informative to 
test whether any delayed effects occur. Another interesting 
avenue would be to study other memory characteristics than 
valence, such as vividness or vantage perspective. As vivid 
imagery is linked to emotion (Holmes and Mathews 2010), 
and vantage perspective plays a role in psychopathology 
(McIsaac and Eich 2004), it is possible that similar biases 
or distortions occur in future projections.
To conclude, we tested a new CBM-E training which 
seemed to work as intended. The training effect generalized 
to interpretation bias in the context of social information, 
but not future to expectations about one’s future. Hence, 
the training may have worked as a standard CBM-I train-
ing instead. No training effects were found on the valence 
of autobiographical recall or future projections. However, 
social anxiety and attachment anxiety appeared to moderate 
training effects and studies in these subgroups are required 
to uncover the interrelatedness of biases in expectancy, 
interpretation, and autobiographical mental time travel. The 
CBM-E training could be optimized in terms of its future 
orientation and length, and long-term effects will need to 
be assessed.
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